Abstract:
Addressing the climate crisis within democratic systems presents significant challenges due to structural deficiencies, including the lack of representation for future generations, short-term decision-making biases, and inadequate integration of scientific evidence. This paper investigates whether democracies can effectively confront the climate crisis and explores alternative organizational models such as authoritarian environmentalism and technocracy. Despite theoretical advantages, empirical evidence suggests these alternatives face practical limitations. Instead, the paper argues for a deliberative democracy approach as a catalyst for enhancing democracy's crisis-coping capacity (CCC). Deliberative democracy emphasizes reasoned dialogue and consensus-building, offering potential solutions to democratic shortcomings in addressing long-term crises like climate change. The paper discusses the concept of deliberative mini-publics (DMPs) as a means to foster inclusive decision-making processes independent of electoral cycles and political influence. It examines the potential benefits and challenges of DMPs and highlights their role in enhancing democratic legitimacy and effectiveness in tackling the climate crisis. Overall, the paper advocates for incremental institutional innovations within democratic systems to address structural weaknesses and effectively manage the climate crisis, ensuring a sustainable future for all generations.
1. Introduction
The climate crisis is one of the most pressing challenges of our time and forces us to question our political systems' effectiveness. According to a study by the Cluster of Excellence Climate, Climatic Change, and Society (CLICCS) at the University of Hamburg, achieving the 1.5- degree target of the Paris Climate Agreement is no longer plausible. Even democracies fail to adopt sufficient policies to combat climate change (Engels et al., 2023, p. 5). Therefore, the question arises as to why democracies are unable to make sufficient political decisions to deal with the climate crisis. I identified three key problems of democracy in dealing with long-term crises, such as the climate crisis. The lack of representation of future generations’ interests (2.1.1), the integration of scientific evidence in policymaking and the influence of entrenched interests on political decision-making processes. My answer to the question of whether democracy is capable of addressing the climate crisis is yes, because democratic innovation from the field of deliberative democracy, in particular, enables us to leverage democracy's crisis-coping capacity (CCC). The discourse in the field of deliberative democracy has produced concepts such as deliberative mini-publics (DMPs), which can add deliberative components to the political decision-making process. I will argue that, despite technocratic and autocratic counterarguments, a deliberative democracy based on broad discussions and the pursuit of consensus is better positioned to provide adequate solutions to the climate crisis. To support this claim, my argument consists of three parts: First, I will explain the various reasons for democracy's inadequate CCC so far. Second, I will discuss alternatives to democratic crisis management, with a particular focus on the counterarguments of authoritarian environmentalists. Third, I will show how deliberative democratic theory can change the way we act within political decision-making processes. Furthermore, I demonstrate how deliberative democracy discourse produces innovative institutional adaptations that can make a crucial contribution to improving democratic crisis management capacity.1 Addressing this question is crucial, as the structure of our political system can have a direct impact on how we as a society respond to existential threats and whether we can secure a livable future for generations to come.
2.1 Why democracies are failing to take sufficient action on climate change Democracies are currently failing to achieve a sufficient climate policy. I was able to identify three different reasons for poor CCC and will elaborate on these in the following part. As mentioned earlier democracies fail to represent other generations’ interests (2.1.1), promote short-termism in decision-making through legislature periods (2.1.2) and were so far unable to effectively integrate scientific evidence in climate crisis management (2.1.3).
2.1.1 The absence of future generations
The lack of representation of the interests of future generations in democratic discourse is a structural problem for long-term decision-making. As Töller points out:
“those who benefit most from today's climate protection have yet to be born” (Töller, 2022, p. 502)
The allocation of political majorities takes place without the inclusion of future generations, even if the decisions have long-term consequences. Therefore, politicians in democracies currently lack the legitimacy to take on short-term costs, even if they would pay off in the long term.
2.1.2 Legislative periods and continuous elections
Legislative periods in democracies normally extend over a period of 4-5 years, which gives politicians an incentive to make election-focused political decisions. The political business cycle results in an incentive structure that makes it almost impossible for politicians to make long-term decisions, as they are measured by their performance during the election period (Nordhaus, 1975, pp. 87–89). Healy and Malhotra also demonstrated this incentive structure in natural disaster politics in the USA. They found that voters reward the government for providing natural disaster relief, but not for investing in natural disaster preparedness. The study thus shows that there is no incentive for politicians to invest in long-term measures, even if they have been shown to lead to an overall increase in public welfare (Healy and Malhotra, 2009, p. 387).
Even if voters would perceive a long-term improvement and accept short-term costs, it is unclear whether the following government would maintain the long-term measures. Thus, myopic decision-making would remain the rational choice for politicians.
2.1.3 Ignorance of scientific evidence
Science has an interactionist inefficiency in its exchange with politics. While scientific knowledge aims to determine a value that is as truthful and exact as possible3 , the function of politics is to find majority opinions and make compromises. In the case of climate change, clear benchmarks are set by scientists, which then go through a political negotiation process and are negotiated down.
2.2 Is there an alternative to democracy?
Given the breadth of challenges that democratic systems have to overcome, the question arises whether alternative forms of state organization have a better CCC than democracies. In particular, autocratic alternatives, such as China's meritocratically organized state apparatus, and technocratic forms of organization, such as expert governments, are very present in the discourse. Both autocratic alternatives and technocratic alternatives belong to authoritarian environmentalism.
2.2.1 Authoritarian environmentalism exemplified by meritocratic
China The Chinese state has some advantages in its structure that have an impact on the CCC. In some of these structures, the supporters of authoritarian environmentalism see the possibility of producing an adequate crisis management of the climate crisis. According to Beeson (2010), authoritarian environmentalism has two dimensions. Firstly, it involves a 'reduction in personal freedom,' restricting individuals from pursuing unsustainable actions and requiring them to adhere to more eco-friendly policies. Secondly, it encompasses a policy-making process predominantly steered by a largely independent central government, giving minimal to no involvement for societal entities (Beeson, 2010, pp. 276, 289). Supporters of authoritarian environmentalism assume that states with a higher capacity to restrict rights and a central, autonomous government are more capable of pursuing effective climate policies. Considering the Chinese state, there is an obvious advantage that the state has over democracies in realizing a high CCC. As a one-party state, the Chinese government has no re-election restrictions through legislative periods and can therefore plan for the long term. Thus, theoretically, decisions with short-term costs that pay off in the long run become possible (cf. 1.2). Moreover, we see the possibility of profound restriction of freedom. As there are already citizen behavior-based ranking systems in China, there would potentially be the possibility to positively reward sustainable behavior as well. Furthermore, there are advantages in the implementation of sustainability projects, such as the expansion of sustainable transportation, as expropriation processes are much easier. In contrast, modern democracies, to varying extents, are anchored in the principle of individual liberty. This foundation limits the state's ability to intrude upon its citizens' lives, even when aiming to safeguard the collective right to preserve the natural foundations of life (Stein, 1998). Supporters of authoritarian environmentalism therefore assume that states with a higher capacity to restrict rights are more capable of pursuing effective climate policy. However, such an effect cannot be clearly identified in the literature. Studies that have examined the number of decisions and effectiveness of CO2-reducing measures in democracies and authoritarian states come to very different conclusions. There are no evident statements for both the number of decisions and effectiveness as to whether democratic or authoritarian environmentalism has outperformed in terms of CO2 reduction (Töller, 2022, pp. 491–492).
Although no direct correlation between authoritarian state concepts and the rate of CO2 change has been found in the literature so far, it is worth taking a look at the Chinese state and its structure. Due to its organizational form, the Chinese state is able to generate a particularly high level of institutional innovation, which could also have an impact on the improvement of democratic institutions. In its organization, the Chinese state apparatus is democratic at the regional level, experimental at the medium level and meritocratic at the highest level. Local governments and small localities are left to a democratic decision-making process on regional issues in order to incorporate regional knowledge as much as possible. Since 1980, there have been village elections, where citizens do not choose between parties, but directly nominate candidates. The citizens know each other and can thus assess leadership abilities and good intentions (Bell, 2017, pp. 316– 317). The middle level of government is the optimal place for experimentation and new institutional concepts. Here, the government structure is much less democratic. Policy goals are set by the highest level of government and vary according to location. For instance, Hangzhou places a high emphasis on environmental sustainability, while Chengdu focuses on bridging the income disparity between its urban and rural inhabitants. Successful institutional concepts are then adopted at the state level where appropriate. The state level is authoritarian and meritocratic in its structure. Only the best and brightest make it into government positions. This is ensured by IQ test-like periodic tests (Bell, 2017, pp. 315–316).
The theoretical concept seems perfect for producing institutional innovations that can increase CCC, but in reality, it is quite different. The Chinese state is struggling with corruption. Centralized structures mean that incremental anti-corruption policies can only be taken topdown and not bottom-up. This creates long term risks for Chinese economic performance and especially for effective climate crisis management. Zhou et. al (2020) were able to establish a link between fighting corruption and reducing CO2 emissions. The anti-corruption campaign launched in 2013 has led to a reduction in CO2 emissions, especially in cities heavily affected by corruption (Zhou et al., 2020, p. 12). A dilution effect of environmental measures became clear, which can influence the CCC in the long term, especially in authoritarian states such as China. Ren et al. (2021) have also been able to demonstrate a causal relationship between the dilution effect and renewable energy technology innovation. This shows a system that could theoretically find quick answers to the climate crisis, but in reality faces some serious challenges (Ren et al., 2021, p. 10).
In its theoretical conception, the Chinese state is thus in a position to create institutional and market economy innovations that can contribute to combating the climate crisis. As has been shown, this theoretical concept faces the challenge of corruption in practice. Therefore, it remains only a theoretical connection. Also, a broader perspective considering autocracies in general could not find a better CCC for autocracies. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that autocracies have a better CCC compared to democracies, even if they are strongly meritocratically organized.
2.2.2 Authoritarian environmentalism and the idea of technocracy
Since also autocracies do not achieve a sufficient transfer of scientific knowledge in politics, the question arises as to whether the intermediary between science and political decisionmaking is needed at all. Technocrats argue that political decision-makers represent a systemic inefficiency in the realization of scientifically evident statements and therefore call for a science-led government (Hulme, 2009, pp. 130–131). Given the problems we have defined, a technocracy could nevertheless solve the representation problem of future generations, shorttermism through electoral cycles and, of course, the problem of engaging scientific discourse. Scientists strive to find the truth and produce evidence. This could be used to shape policy guidelines, which then only need to be implemented. For example, prices could be set in CO2 certificate trading that correspond to the actual CO2 budget without the structural inefficiency of the policy.
Such an argument sounds plausible and can still be found in some places in the literature. What such a logic completely ignores, however, is that as soon as the first expert had been selected for such a policy headship, the first policy decision would already have been made. Although science strives for truth, it is undoubtedly not without power structures. Science is socially, culturally and financially integrated into society through its scientists. So when scientists are given a political mandate like this, we have no reason to believe that they will not behave according to the logic of politics (Toeller et al., 2022, p. 286).
Although various elaborations have shown that science cannot be clearly separated from politics, the demand for the implementation of technocratic structures has persisted in the discourse until today (Cole, 2022; Schmidt, 2021). Although the technocratic idea is much less present in current literature than autocratic ideas (cf. 2.2.1), it is nevertheless taken up here because it could emerge as a logical conclusion from the previously elaborated problems of democratic CCC (cf. 2.1).
2.3 Deliberative democracy as a catalyst for CCC
Since alternative forms of organization fail to produce sufficient CCC to address the climate crisis, it is up to democracy to incrementally create institutional innovation. The deliberative understanding of democracy has had a catalytic effect on institutional innovation in this context. In the following, I will first explain what the deliberative model of democracy is and why this model produces crucial institutional innovation. Finally, I will explain the recently discussed concept of deliberative mini-publics and its influence on CCC.
2.3.1 Deliberative democracy driving institutional innovation
Deliberative democracy refers to a conception of democracy in which the emphasis is on the processes of opinion-forming and reasoned dialogue between citizens. Unlike pure voting processes, where majority decisions are paramount, deliberative democracy emphasizes the ability of citizens to shape and, if necessary, change their preferences and opinions through public discussion and argumentation. A core principle of deliberative democracy is the idea that democratic decisions should be arrived at not only by counting votes but also through the qualitative process of thinking, discussing and arguing together. Therefore, transparency, equality of participation and recognition of the rationality of each participant are central aspects (Habermas, 1992a, 1992b).
Deliberative politics, often referred to as the discourse-theoretical model of democracy, differs in fundamental ways from the liberal and republican models. While the liberal model sees the state as determined by market mechanisms and views politics primarily as a means of securing fundamental rights and private interests, the republican model emphasizes the state as an expression of moral life and civil society. Here, the focus is on solidarity-based politics and active citizenship, with citizens characterized by positive rights and their active participation in the political process. The discourse-theoretical model, on the other hand, treads a middle path that does not rely exclusively on moral norms or market interests. It places its main focus on the process of opinion formation through multiple discourses. These discourses can be pragmatic, ethical or moral. Instead of emphasizing individual rights or the common good, deliberative politics prioritizesthe "ideal speech situation" and subjectless communication. This means that in this model the dialogue and the argument put forward are central, detached from individual interests or power dynamics. It is not just a question of who is speaking or what point of view is being advocated, but rather how and in what setting it is spoken. The aim is to arrive at a collective and reasonable decision through this kind of discourse, through transparent and fair procedures (Ottmann, 2008, pp. 317–318).
The engine of the deliberative process that Habermas and other advocates of deliberative democracy emphasize is the "unconstrained compulsion of the better argument"5 (Habermas, 1971, p. 137). It is this engine that makes deliberation such an effective tool in the search for the optimal policy decision. Understanding democracy as a deliberative form of organization means focusing on internal communication flows and analyzing the influence of external communication flows. This approach makes the deliberative democracy model an innovation driver for institutional change (cf. 2.3.2).
But how can the perspective of deliberative democracy help to strengthen the CCC of democracies? As noted earlier, democracy has so far been unable to pass sufficient legislation to combat the climate crisis and to comply with the Paris Climate Agreement (cf. 2.1). In the current discourse on the structural problems of the political decision-making process, we were able to extract three problems that have a negative impact on decision-making capacity. Deliberative democracy provides different answers to the question of how these problems can be remedied.
As already explained, the lack of representation of future generations (cf. 2.1.1) and the reelection restriction through legislative periods (cf. 2.1.2) leads to political decision-makers behaving in a short-term manner. This is a structural disadvantage that leads to politicians applying System 1 thinking, in other words interacting with each other and with the media in an automatic and reactive way. In contrast, the implementation of deliberative frameworks enables our system 2 or slow thinking. This thinking enables politicians to hear and reflect on the arguments of others, rather than being pushed to an opinion quickly or through provocation. Through the deliberative process, participants are aligned with the common good, which provides space to consider the interests of future generations as well as other non-human actors. Furthermore, deliberation builds consensus by allowing the better to prevail through the exchange of arguments. A deliberative approach therefore allows climate change to be seen as an ongoing crisis that has diverse implications and counteracts the political trend of focusing only on immediate problems (Willis et al., 2022, pp. 4–5).
The involvement of scientists in the decision-making process is also strengthened by the implementation of deliberative frameworks. Science itself is a deliberative process in which the “unconstrained compulsion of the better argument” counts. This process does not always have to result in clear consensus evidence in the short and medium term; it is an imperfect process. It is therefore important that scientific deliberation processes are reflected in politics in the same way as they are reflected in science. In relation to the climate crisis science-policy interaction, this means clearly communicating the consensus around the question of whether climate change exists and addressing more controversial questions of how to solve the climate crisis in a more differentiated way. This will ensure that policymakers engage with, among other things, the argument of this paper. The scientific input goes through the political evaluation process and at the end there is the political decision. Deliberation is the transport medium. It is therefore of immediate importance to take more account of this medium in the design of the policy-making process. In the next part on deliberative mini-publics, I will go into more detail on how deliberation as a transport medium can be better taken into account in the decision-making process.
In relation to institutional output controls, such as the Constitutional Court, deliberative flows from academia already seem to be better integrated. On 24 March 2021, the German Constitutional Court decided that the Climate Protection Act (KSG) passed in 2019 does not go far enough to achieve the 1.5 degree target or at least the 2.0 degree target. This decision followed from the deliberative interaction with the German Advisory Council on the Environment (SRU). The Constitutional Court based its argumentation on the CO2 budget calculated by the SRU (SRU, 2020, pp. 37–93; Töller, 2022, pp. 495–496). It can be seen here that by exploiting the deliberative resource in institutional output controls, significant gains can be made for the CCC.
Of course, these approaches to improvement are still relatively little concrete and do not yet indicate structural improvements in the decision-making process. Therefore, in the following, I would like to present two innovative concepts for the structural application of deliberative democracy to improve CCC.
2.3.2 Deliberative mini-publics (DMPs)
Bringing deliberation into focus in the analysis of policy-making processes has produced innovative institutional adaptations. One of these innovations is the so-called deliberative minipublics. The idea is to map society with randomly selected citizens and to discuss specific topics according to the principle of the "informal process of the better argument". This is followed by recommendations or guidelines for the democratically elected political decision-making body. Why this concept is so exciting for climate crisis management is because DMPs are independent of institutionally given incentive systems for politicians. Participating citizens are not elected and are therefore not subject to re-election restrictions (cf. 2.1.2). Furthermore, there is no interactionist inequality in the exchange with science, as citizens are not subject to political pressure to compromise (cf. 2.1.3). Willis (2022) divides the exact procedure of a DMP into four steps. First, the random selection of the representative group. Ethnic, cultural and social factors can be included in the sampling so that marginalized groups are not excluded. Secondly, there is a learning phase at the beginning of a DMP, in which the participants receive lectures from researchers and are provided with resources for research and evaluation. Thirdly, there is the actual deliberation process, where citizens come together and discuss. These sessions are conducted and moderated by a trained discussion leader. The concrete design can vary greatly and should be conceptualized in more detail in future research. Fourthly, a proposal or guideline for politicians is produced. This point is particularly crucial because it determines how the deliberative process is connected to the political system. From a public recommendation that politicians can use to an actual decision-making authority, everything is possible here. For example, the DMPs of the city of Gdansk have been structured in such a way that decisions of the citizens' council have to be implemented from a supermajority of 80% (Gerwin and Kucharska, 2018; Smith, 2021; Willis et al., 2022, p. 6).
Of course, DMPs also entail risks. There is the oracle problem6, which has to be solved. Which scientists inform the DMPs and which scientific positions are represented? For the deliberative process, it is of central importance what input the DMPs receive, since the deliberative process is based on the positions presented. However, this is not a problem that only affects DMPs, but also affects policymakers. Therefore, the response of deliberative democrats in this case does not vary with respect to DMPs. The goal must be to control the input in such a way that the scientific consensus is represented. Thus, for the question of the existence of climate change, diverse positions should not be mapped, but for the question of how to solve the climate crisis, they should be mapped very well. Moreover, there is a danger that politicians will cherry-pick individual decisions of a DMP that fit their political agenda and leave others out. In such a context, DMPs would merely become a political tool to give force to a decision that is already fixed (Font et al., 2018). This can be avoided by giving DMPs their own voice, for example in the form of an elected spokesperson who reports directly to the media. It must be ensured that the communication stream comes from the institution itself and not through political decisionmakers.
It turns out that DMP's success is particularly dependent on its structure . What has been proven, however, is that they can have a positive effect on CCC.
3. Conclusion
As shown before, democracies have difficulties in taking adequate action against the climate crisis, especially due to structural problems such as the lack of representation of future generations, short-term political thinking and the often poor integration of scientific evidence. While authoritarian and technocratic approaches might offer some solutions, they lack the participatory legitimacy and transparency needed for sustainable change. In contrast, it could be shown that the deliberative democracy perspective has a catalytic effect on the CCC of democracies, by including a broader range of perspectives, more long-term thinking and the effective use of scientific knowledge. Decision-making processes could be rethought based on the resource deliberation, so that incremental improvements and external democratic innovations become possible. Using the example of the democratic innovation DMP, it was possible to show how institutional adjustments can provide effective solutions to structural weaknesses of democracy. However, the innovation presented does not claim to be the sole solution to the lacking CCC. In addition, there are other democratic innovations, such as offices for future generations (OFGs), which can contribute to a better management of the climate crisis. To meet the upcoming challenges of the climate crisis, democracies need to renew and expand their decision-making processes. A more deliberative approach could be the key to effectively addressing the challenges of our time and ensuring a livable future for generations to come.
Maximilian Hüls
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